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Organisational Design for Co-Management : 
Comparing Four Committees in Nunavik* 
Evelyn J. PETERS** 
The Brundtland Report focused on the importanee of institutional 
arrangements in solving pressing resource problem.. Co-management 
arrangemenss have been an important avenue for Aboriginass to partici-
pate in the management of country foods, and the environmenss that sup-
port them. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, signed in 
1975, created several co-management bodies that focus on environments 
and wildlife. This paper draws on the extensive body of literature on co-
management to develop three principles to evaluate these arrangements. 
These principles have to do with the ability of committess to adapt to 
changing environmenss and demand,, their effectiveness in influencing 
government decision-making, and their ability to represent Aboriginal 
cultures and values. Each of the co-management bodies created by the 
Agreement is evaluated according to these criteria. 
Le Rapport Brundtland a souligné l’importanee des arrangements 
institutionnels pour résoudre les problèmss liés à la gestion des res-
sources naturelles. Pour les autochtones, les arrangemenss de cogestion 
* I wish to express my appreciation to all of the members of the co-management commit-
tees who generously gave of their time and shared their insights, despite their very busy 
schedules. Michele Dupuis and Nicole Gombay conducted the interviews, and I very 
much appreciate their skilful work. The research was funded by an SSHRC MCRI #412-
97-0014 : “Sustainable Development in the Arctic : Conditions for Food Security”. Er-
rors of omission and interpretation are my responsibility. 
** Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair, Department of Geography, University 
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représentent une façon de participer à la gestion des ressources fauniques 
et à la proteciion environnementale. La Convention de la Baie-James et 
du Nord québécois, signée en 1975, créa plusieurs comités de cogestion 
ayant pour objet Venvironnement et les ressources faunique.. Cet article 
examine la littérature sur la cogesiion et en dégage trois principes géné-
raux. Plus particulièrement, ces principes interrogent la capactté des co-
mités de cogestion de s’adapter aux nouvelles demandes et défis 
environnementaux, d’influencrr les décisions des autorités gguvernemen-
tales et de représenter la culture et les valeurs autochtones. Chacun des 
comités de cogesiion créés par la Convention est évalué suivant cette 
grille. 
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In the past three decades, there has been considerable attention paid 
to co-management as an important mechanism for the effective manage-
ment of natural resources. Co-management offers the possibility of reduced 
conflict over resources use1, increased incorporation of local knowledge2, 
enhanced resource sustainability3, and the potential for circulating benefits 
back into the community4. In the context of concerns about food security, 
co-management committees can play an important role in protecting envi-
ronments and managing wildlife resources to ensure the continued avail-
ability of country foods. 
The term “co-management” encompasses a variety of organisational 
arrangements, functions and levels of power-sharing. It ranges from rela-
tively simple arrangements with government managers sharing power with 
users over limited resources and geographic areas, to legislated arrange-
ments evolving from Aboriginal self-government negotiations. The stake-
holders involved, the institutions created and the types of responsibilities 
E. PINKERTON, Co-operative Managemett of Local Fisheries : New Directions for Im-
proved Management and Community Development, Vancouver, University of British 
Columbia Press, 1989 ; D.M. DUFFY, M. ROSELAND and T.I. GUNTON, “A Preliminary 
Assessment of Shared Decision-making in Land Use and Natural Resource Planning”, 
Environments, vol. 23, no 2, 1996, p. 1. 
M.M.R. FREEMAN, “The Nature and Utility of Traditional Ecological Knowledge”, 
Northern Perspeciive,, vol. 20, no 1, 1992, p. 9 ; T. SWERDFAGER, Cooperative Wildlife 
Management : A Discussion Paper, Ottawa, The Canadian Wildlife Service, 1992 ; P.J. 
USHER, “Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Environmental Assessment and Manage-
ment”, Arctic, vol. 53, no 2, 2000, p. 183. 
M. GADGIL, F. BERKES and C. FOLKE, “Indigenous Knowledge for Biodiversity Conser-
vation”, Ambio, vol. 22, nos 2-3, 1993, p. 151 ; T. SWERDFAGER, op. cit., note 2. 
S. HAWKES, “The Gwaii Haanas Agreement: From Conflict to Consensus”, in M. 
ROSELAND, D.J. D U F F Y and T.I. GUNTON, Shared Decision-Making and Natural Re-
source Planning: Canadian Insights”, Environments, vol. 23, no 2, 1996, p. 87; B.F. 
NOBLE, “Institutional Criteria for Co-management”, Marine Policy, vol. 24, no 1, 2000, p. 
69 ; E. PINKERTON, op. cit., note 1 ; D. WITTY, “The Practice Behind the Theory: Co-
management as a Community Development Tool”, Plan Canada, 1994, p. 22. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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exercised vary widely5. Levels of power sharing vary from information 
sharing, to an advisory role, to user partnership with government bodies6. 
While some authors suggest that lower levels of power sharing do not rep-
resent true co-management, it is clear that even advisory bodies can have a 
significant effect on government decision-making7. As a result, this paper 
adopts Notzke’s8 general definition: “Co-management” broadly refers to 
the sharing of power and responsibility between government and local re-
source users. This is achieved by various levels of integration of local and 
state level management systems.” Co-management arrangements have been 
instituted in a large number of countries internationally and some of these 
institutions have long-term experiences with public participation in natural 
resource management9 
Despite the increasing familiarity of co-management arrangements and 
recognition of their potential benefits, there has been relatively little analy-
sis that explores aspects of institutional structure and organisational de-
sign that maximise their ability to operate effectively10. Institutions form 
the structures through which decisions are made and actions are taken. The 
purpose of this paper is to compare elements of institutional design of four 
co-management committees established pursuant to the 1975 James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreemen,, with a focus on Nunavik, Quebec. The 
paper explores the perspectives of participants on elements of institutional 
design that facilitate or constrain the work of these committees. Many 
5. F. BERKES, P. GEORGE and R. PRESTON, Co-Management : The Evolution of The Theory 
and Practice of the Joint Administration of Living Resource,, TASO Research Report, 
Second Series, No. 1, Program for Technology Assessment in Subarctic Ontario, 
Hamilton, McMaster University, 1991 ; C. NOTZKE, “A New Perspective in Aboriginal 
Natural Resources Management : Co-management”, Geoforum, vol. 26, no 2,1995, p. 187. 
6. F. BERKES, P. GEORGE and R. PRESTON, op. cit., note 5. 
7. E. PINKERTON, “The Contribution of Watershed-Based Multi-Party Co-Management 
Agreements to Dispute Resolution: The Skeena Watershed Committee”, in M.D. 
ROSELAND, M. DORLI and T.I. GUNTON (ed.), op. cit., note 4, p. 51,56 ; P.J. USHER, “The 
Beverly-Kaminuriak Caribou Management Board : An Experience in Co-management”, 
in J.T. INGLIS (ed.), Traditional Ecological Knowledge : Concepts and Cases, Ottawa, 
UNESCO Canada/MAB, 1993, p. 111. 
8. C. NOTZKE, loc. cit., note 5, 187. 
9. A.K.J. BICKMORE, Evaluaiing the Co-management Instituiions Created by the James 
Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement with Plan-
ning Criteria, unpublished M.Pl. thesis, Kingston, Queen’s University, School of Urban 
and Regional Planning, 2002. 
10. D.E. LANE and R.L. STEPHENSON, “Institutional Arrangements for Fisheries : Alternate 
Structures and Impediments to Change”, Marine Policy, vol. 24, no 5, 2000, p. 385 ; B.F. 
NOBLE, loc. cit., note 4. 
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evaluations of co-management arrangements rely on the perspectives of 
analysts who are not part of these committees. Here we attempt to present 
the views of “insiders”. 
The analysis is based on interviews conducted in the summer and win-
ter of 2000 with almost all of the committee members on four co-manage-
ment committees — the Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Co-ordinating 
Committee, the Kativik Environmental Quality Commission, the Kativik 
Environmental Advisory Committee, and the Federal Review Commit-
tee—North. Since the interviews were conducted, the Nunavik Commis-
sion tabled its report recommending the creation of a new form of 
government in Nunavik, for all of its residents. In 2003 the governments of 
Quebec, Canada, and Makivik Corporation representing the Inuit, signed a 
Framework Agreement which established a formal process for negotiating 
a new form of governance in the region. These developments may mean 
that aspects of the co-management committees may change in the near fu-
ture. Nevertheless comparing the four committees as they worked in 2000 
may help identify relationships between elements of organisational design 
and effectiveness in meeting particular objectives. 
1 Elements of Institutional Design : A Literature Review 
Co-management committees have many goals and this paper explores 
institutional design in relation to three of them—institutional adaptiveness, 
effectiveness in influencing government decision-making, and ability to 
represent Aboriginal values and interests. These elements are key because 
they have to do with the main spheres of activity of co-management com-
mittees — their internal operation (adaptiveness), their external influence 
(effectiveness), and their relationship with their Aboriginal constituency. 
1.1 Adaptiveness 
For several decades, researchers have emphasized the need for adap-
tive structures in environmental and resource management11. Mulvihill and 
Keith12 define adaptiveness as “the ability to remain functional amidst con-
textual complexity and difficulty, to shift directions and approaches where 
11. F. BERKES and C. FOLKE (ed.), Linking Social and Ecological Systems : Management 
Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000 ; B. MITCHELL, Resource and Environmental Management, Harlow, 
Longman, 1997. 
12. P.R. MULVIHILL and R.F. KEITH, “Institutional Requirements for Adaptive EIA : The 
Kativik Environmental Quality Commission”, Environmental Impact Assessment Re-
view, vol. 9, no 4, 1989, p. 399. 
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appropriate, to perceive and seize opportunities, and to be sufficiently in-
novative as to effect change.” Folke, Berkes and Colding13 define adaptive 
institutions as having the “ability to reorganize under changing circum-
stances”. Much of the work on adaptive organisations follows Holling’s14 
suggestion that the limits of our knowledge of ecological and social sys-
tems means that management will be faced with uncertainty and unex-
pected results. Rondinelli15 draws on his experience with development 
projects to argue that adaptive institutions are needed because 
organisations operate in increasingly complicated environments under con-
ditions of rapid change. Similarly Trist16 has suggested that institutions 
work in complex and even turbulent contexts which create the need for 
resilience and an ability to adapt. 
There is some work that addresses aspects of institutional design that 
facilitates adaptiveness. One theme is that while organisational goals, man-
dates and processes should be well-defined, they should also be broad 
enough to allow for flexibility and innovation. Mitchell17 suggests that gen-
eral or vague goals provide “scope to custom-design implementation to suit 
differing conditions”. They also allow local actors to modify processes and 
goals to meet local needs and conditions. Mulvihill and Keith18 suggest that 
if mandates and processes are defined but not rigid, organisations can re-
spond to new and unexpected problems and challenges. Jacobs and 
Mulvihill19 note that institutions should have no more detail than neces-
sary for their operations, so that they can be continuously self-organising. 
13. C. FOLKE, F. BERKES and J. COLDING, “Ecological Practices and Social Mechanisms for 
Building Resilience and Sustainability”, in C. FOLKE, F. BERKES and C. FOLKE (ed.), 
Linking Social and Ecological Systems : Management Practices and Social Mechanisms 
for Building Resilience, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 414, 426. 
14. C.S. HOLLING (ed.), Adapiive Environmental Assessment and Management, Toronto, 
Wiley, 1978. 
15. D.A. RONDINELLI, Development Projects as Policy Experimenss : An Adaptive Ap-
proach to Development Administration, London, Routledge, 1993. 
16. E. TRIST, “The Environment and System-response Capability”, Futures, vol. 12, no 2, 
1980, p. 113 ; E. TRIST, “Referent Organizations and the Development of Inter-Organiza-
tional Domains”, Human Relations, vol. 36, no 3, 1983, p. 269. 
17. B. MITCHELL, op. cit., note 11, p. 142. 
18. r\R. MULVIHILL and R.r*. JVEITH, loc. cit., note 12, 408. 
19. P. JACOBS and P.R. MULVIHILL, Ancient Lands : New Perspectives. Towards Multi-
cultural Literacy in Landscape Management , Landscape and Urban Planning, vol. 32, 
no 1, 1995, p. 7, 14. 
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Size of membership has an effect on the ability to create positive group 
dynamics essential for adaptive decision-making. Noble20 notes that gov-
ernments and larger organisations must balance the need for appropriate 
level of diversity of members to represent regional interests, with the fact 
that limited memberships facilitates communication and decision-making. 
Similarly Mulvihill and Keith21 argue that while diversity (to represent re-
gional interests) and redundancy (to provide reserve capacity) are impor-
tant, “an organization’s efficiency with regard to decision-making decreases 
in direct proportion to its size [...] [and] positive group dynamics may be 
more easily achieved and sustained in smaller organizations”. 
Finally, adaptive organisations are characterised by their ability to 
interact with and co-ordinate initiatives with other relevant institutions22. 
Trist23 emphasises the need for “referent” institutions that identify emer-
gent issues and work out with other institutions “desirable futures and 
[ways of] modifying practice accordingly”. Mobilizing resources and de-
veloping a network of external relations is important to this function. 
Mitchell24 notes that “ more participants will bring more information and 
perspectives to help define issues and develop solutions”. Folke, Berkes 
and Colding25 see the capacity to operate at more than one level as an im-
portant characteristic of adaptive institutions. The implication for institu-
tional design is that organisations should have a membership that is 
relevant to the issues under consideration, and that members are embed-
ded in communications networks that facilitate communication and the 
flow of information. 
1.2 Effectiveness 
A number of design criteria seem to support effective intervention by 
co-management organisations in government decision-making. Drawing on 
the experience of non-legislated co-management structures, Mulvihill and 
Keith26 conclude that a legislative base enhances the power and credibility 
co-management organisations have, allowing them to assume a prominent 
20. B.F. NOBLE, loc. cit., note 4. 
21. r\R. MULVIHILL and R.F. JVEITH, loc. cit., note 12, 404. 
zz. B.F. INOBLE, loc. cit., note 4, 70. 
15. E. TRIST, Referent Organizations and the Development of Inter-Orgamzational Do-
mains , loc. cit., note 16, 275-276. 
, [j. ., , p . 
25. C. FOLKE, F. BERKES and J. COLDING, loc. cit., note 13, 424. 
26. P.R. MULVIHILL and R.F. KEITH, loc. cit., note 12, 405. 
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place in the decision-making system. Winn27 places less emphasis on legis-
lation, but indicates that a co-management organisation should be estab-
lished by a formal agreement. 
Much of the discussion about the ability of co-management 
organisations to influence government decision-making has been based on 
the kinds of powers allocated to these organisations. Berkes, George and 
Preston28, for example, proposed an ascending scale of community partici-
pation in natural resources management. The lowest levels of the scale are 
dominated by a lack of cooperation between community users and govern-
ment managers : managers make all the decisions and rarely share informa-
tion with users. In the middle levels, managers and users exchange 
information and begin to make decisions together. Users make most of the 
decisions in the top levels of the scale. Co-management organisations which 
integrate local and statement management fall at the upper levels of the 
scale. At the same time Notzke29 notes that it is difficult in practice to 
categorise co-management institutions according to their decision-making 
power For example committees with advisory power can have a signifi-
cant effect on government decision-making30 
Moreover, the establishment of co-management organisations through 
legislation and agreements and the specification of their powers are not 
sufficient to establish an effective role in decision-making. Landmann31 
notes that in order to be useful, governments must accord committees a 
place in decision-making structures. Legislation and agreements must be 
implemented in the sense that governments regularly consult them, that 
they are linked with appropriate governmental organisations, that govern-
ment participants have decision-making ability and that co-management 
bodies are provided with the support, financial and technical, that allows 
them to play an appropriate role32. 
27. S.N. W I N N , Co-management under the Inuvialuit Final Agreement : Bridging the gap 
between indigenous self-regulation and state-based resource management in the West-
ern Arctic, unpublished M.A. thesis, Ottawa, Carleton University, 1991, p. 117. 
28. F. BERKES, P. CJEORGE and R. PRESTON, op. cit,, note 5. 
29. C. NOTZKE, loc. cit., note 5, 190-191. 
30. P.J. USHER, loc. cit., note 7. 
31. P. LANDMANN, Co-management of Wuaiife under the James Bay Treaty: The Hunting, 
Fishing, and Trapping Coordinating Committee, unpublished M.A. thesis, Quebec, 
Université Laval Faculté des études supérieures, 1988, p. 57, 58. 
il. (J. OSHERENKO, Wildlife Management in the North American Arctic : The Case of Co-
management , inM.M.K. FREEMAN and L.IN. CARBYN (ed.), Traditional Knowledge and 
Renewable Resource Management, Edmonton, Boreal Institute for Northern Studies, 
1988, p. 92, 103 ; E..J. PETERS, Native People and the Environmental Regime in the 
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1.3 Representation of Aboriginal values and cultures 
Because co-management arrangements involving Aboriginal people 
have the opportunity to incorporate indigenous systems of knowledge and 
management, they are viewed as having the potential to contribute to the 
maintenance and development of Aboriginal people’s cultures and societ-
ies. Richardson and Green33 note, with respect to the Haida : 
This is perhaps the most important reason for co-management — to provide a 
means for different cultures with conflicting values to share in a resource. Man-
agement of fisheries resources by one culture results in the almost complete loss 
of the ability of the resources to provide for the values of another culture. 
Osherenko34 identifies several criteria for success in incorporating 
Native people into co-management arrangements. One criterion is that the 
regime must have the co-operation and support of the community that it is 
intended to serve. In terms of institutional design, this goes beyond a re-
quirement for Native membership and implies that co-management com-
mittees have regular ways of communicating with and obtaining the views 
of the communities they represent. Mulvihill and Keith35 also emphasise 
the importance of contact and communication with constituents. A second 
criterion Osherenko suggests is that Native groups must be accorded a cer-
tain amount of authority in decision-making. Winn36 similarly argues that 
shared decision-making is an important measure of the incorporation of 
Native people. Finally, Osherenko notes that cultural and linguistic barri-
ers to full Native participation must be avoided. This criterion addresses 
elements such as the location of meetings, availability of interpretation, 
translation of key information into Native languages, and the use of Native 
systems of decision-making. 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement”, Arctic, vol. 52, no 4, 1999, p. 395 ; K.L. 
ROBERTS, Circumpolar Aboriginal People and co-management practice : current issues 
in co-management and environmental assessment, Calgary, Arctic Institute of North 
America and Joint Secretariat-Inuvialuit Renewable Resource Committees, 1996, p. 3 ; 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, Perspeciives and Realities, Report of 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 4, Ottawa, Canada Communications 
Group, 1996, p. 677 ; S.N. W I N N , op. cit., note 27. 
33. M. RICHARDSON and W. GREEN, “The Fisheries co-management Initiative in Haida 
Gwaii”, in E. PINKERTON (ed.), Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries, 
Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1989, p. 249, 259. 
34. G OSHERENKO, Sharing Power with Native Users: Co-Management Regimes for Arc-
tic Wildlife, CARC Policy Paper 5, Ottawa, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1988, 
p. 103. 
35. P.R. JVIULVIHILL and R.r\ K.EITH, loc. cit., note 12, 406. 
36. S.N. WINN, op. cit., note 27. 
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2 Context and Methodology 
2.1 Nunavik Co-Management Committees 
Many of these issues are important for the functioning of co-manage-
ment committees established under the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreemen,, signed in 1975. While the Agreement refers to a large area in 
northern Quebec, Canada, this paper is concerned with the region prima-
rily north of the 55th parallel, hereafter referred to as Nunavik. Nunavik is 
a sparsely populated region with approximately 10,000 people. Most of 
these people are Inuit, living in fourteen coastal villages and participating 
in a mixed economy that features wage employment as well as wildlife 
harvesting. 
The Agreement established four committees to manage harvesting and 
environments in Nunavik. The focus of the committees on harvesting and 
environments, the establishment of regimes which take into account Na-
tive hunting economies, and the participation of regional representatives 
was meant to ensure Native people would have an established place in 
decision-making for all of these committees. Brooke37 notes that : 
the expectations the Inuit and Cree communities had when they ratified the docu-
ment, especially in the areas of lands, resources and environment, were for effec-
tive participation in decision-making, respect for their values, knowledge and 
traditions and confidence that hunting, fishing and trapping practices would con-
tinue and evolve in a context largely of their own making. 
2.1.1 The Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Committee 
Section 24 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement estab-
lishes a harvesting regime administered by the Hunting, Fishing and Trap-
ping Coordinating Committee (HFTCC). The HFTCC was established in 
1976 as an expert body made up of Native and government members, and 
was to review, manage and in certain cases supervise and regulate the hunt-
ing, fishing and trapping regime put in place by the Agreement. In the words 
of the Agreement38, the HFTCC is “the preferential and exclusive forum 
for Native people and government jointly to formulate regulations and su-
pervise the administration and management of the Hunting, Fishing and 
37. L.F. BROOKE, The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement : Experiences of the 
Nunavik Inuit with Wildlife Management, Ottawa, Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, 1995, n. p. 
38. CANADA, QUEBEC, The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, Montréal, Éditeur 
officiel du Québec, 1976, p. 371. 
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Trapping Regime”. The HFTCC has three members each from federal and 
provincial governments, and from the Cree and Inuit signatories to the 
Agreement (Table 1). The Naskapi joined the Committee (with two mem-
bers) with the 1978 Northeastern Quebec Agreement. The Chair rotates 
annually from among the parties and has the tie-breaking vote. 
The HFTCC supervises Native harvesting rights and the harvesting 
regime outlined in the Agreement, including arrangements for outfitting. 
The HFTCC also makes recommendations to federal and provincial gov-
ernments about conservation, hunting, fishing and trapping. With the ex-
ception of its authority to establish an upper limit of kill for caribou and 
moose, and make management decisions for black bear in a certain limited 
zone, the HFTCC is advisory in nature. However, a Minister must re-con-
sult the HFTCC prior to taking an action contrary to a recommendation. 
Table 1 : Co-management Committee in Nunavik 
Committee Mandate Membership/ 
Appointed by 
Number 
Interviewed 
HFTCC Supervises harvesting regime, 
recommends measures to 
governments, manages 
harvesting of some species 
3 by Inuit 
3 by Crée 
2 by JNaskapi 
4 by Quebec 
4 by Canada 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
KEAC Reviews environmental policies 
and legislation, makes 
recommendations to governments 
3 by Kativik 
3 by Quebec 
3 by Canada 
3 
3 
2 
KEQC Recommends and sets guidelines for 
environmental and social impact 
assessment ; decides if project 
should go forward 
4 by Kativik 
5 by Quebec 
4 
5 
FRC-N Recommends and sets guidelines 
for environmental and social 
impact assessment 
2 by Kativik 
3 by Canada 
2 
3 
2.1.2 The Environmental Protection Committees 
Section 23 of the Agreement sets out the processes and criteria to be 
employed in assessing the social and environmental effects of develop-
ments north of the 55th parallel. The environmental protection committees 
described in the Agreement became operational around 1978. The Kativik 
Environmental Advisory Committee (KEAC) was established as a consul-
tative body to responsible governments concerning the environmental re-
gime and the formulation of laws relating to the environment. There are 
three nominees from each of the Kativik Regional Government represent-
ing the residents of Nunavik, Quebec, and Canada on the Advisory 
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Committee. The KEAC has responsibility to review existing and proposed 
development-related legislation and regulations (including environmental 
impact assessments) that affect Inuit environments, and to recommend en-
vironmental laws, regulations and other measures to responsible govern-
ments. Federal and provincial governments are required to fund a 
secretariat for the committees, and the committees can call on expert ad-
vice if required. 
Two additional bodies deal specifically with environmental and social 
impact assessment processes in Nunavik. The Federal Review Committee 
North (FRC-N) focuses on issues falling under federal jurisdiction. Al-
though the structure of the committee was formalised shortly after the 
Agreement was signed, meetings have been irregular since relatively few 
developments have been defined as requiring federal attention. The FRC-
N is composed of two representatives appointed by the Kativik Regional 
Government and three representatives appointed by Canada. The Kativik 
Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC) focuses on matters falling 
under provincial jurisdiction. It is composed of four representatives ap-
pointed by the Kativik Regional Government and four representatives ap-
pointed by Quebec. The Chair is nominated by the province, but must be 
approved by the Kativik Regional Government. The Commission exam-
ines projects ranging from relatively simple issues such as the construction 
of solid waste disposal in an Inuit community, to issues as complex as the 
Great Whale hydroelectric project. 
Federal and provincial governments fund staffing requirements for 
these bodies and pay for experts required in their deliberations. When a 
new development is proposed, these bodies make recommendations to the 
appropriate Administrator (federal, provincial or Kativik depending on the 
jurisdiction under which the proposed development falls) about the need 
for an environmental impact statement and its nature and extent. The Ad-
ministrator makes the decision and, if appropriate, issues guidelines for the 
assessment to the proponent. The Commission evaluates the environmen-
tal impact statement submitted by the proponent. While the FRC-N is ad-
visory, the KEQC decides whether or not a development may be allowed 
to proceed. 
2.2 Methodology 
The information upon which this paper is based was collected through 
a series of more general interviews that explored the history and operation 
of co-management committees in Nunavik. All of the interviews were con-
ducted in the winter and summer of 2000. The interviews addressed three 
main topics : how committees functioned and their influence on govern-
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ment decision-making ; the role of Inuit cultures and knowledge in com-
mittee decision-making ; and the contribution of committees to the protec-
tion of sources of, and access to, country foods in Nunavik. The material 
on which this paper is based was drawn from responses to questions in the 
first two sections. 
While the project attempted to interview all of the members of each of 
the committees, the Cree and Naskapi interviews from the HFTCC were 
not included in the analysis for this paper. Of the remaining members, one 
member of one committee refused to be interviewed, one was difficult to 
contact and we gave up after attempting for one month to set up an inter-
view, and one member had died shortly before the interviews were sched-
uled. Two interviews were carried out with members who had recently 
resigned, but had served on the committee for a very long period of time. It 
was felt that these members would provide perspectives on the committee’s 
functioning that their recent replacement could not have. Except for the 
member who had died shortly before the interviews began, all of the Inuit 
representatives to the committees were interviewed. Three individuals 
were members of more than one committee. The interviews attempted to 
ascertain their views for each committee on which they served, separately. 
In total, twenty-eight of a possible thirty-one members were interviewed 
for this paper. 
Graduate students who had experience in research in the North car-
ried out the interviews. Interviews lasted between one and two and one 
half-hours. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, but two were 
conducted by phone. Interviews were conducted in English or French, by 
choice of the respondents. One Inuit interview was conducted with an in-
terpreter, but the remaining interviews with Inuit representatives were con-
ducted in English. Interview questions were open-ended, and interviewers 
were instructed to probe certain issues if respondents did not volunteer 
information. 
All of the interviews were taped, except one that was not, by request 
of the respondent. Interviews were transcribed, and the texts of the inter-
views were analysed according to themes identified from the review of the 
literature, and according to themes that emerged from the transcripts them-
selves. Interviews conducted in French were translated into English. There 
was some slight editing of some of the quotations included in this paper, 
when it seemed likely that the identity of the individual respondents might 
be revealed by the expressions used. 
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3 Adaptiveness, Effectiveness and Representation 
on Nunavik Co-Management Committees 
Drawing on respondent perspectives, we addressed aspects of institu-
tional design that might facilitate or constrain committees’ abilities to meet 
the objectives of adaptiveness, effectiveness and representation. 
3.1 Adaptiveness 
3.1.1 Flexibility 
According to a number of writers, adaptive organisations have clear 
mandates but maintain the flexibility to make changes in order to meet 
challenges and address problems. We attempted to assess this dimension 
with questions that asked participants to summarise the organisation’s 
mandate in their own words, to indicate if there had been changes in the 
way the committee had functioned over time, and to describe these 
changes. Responses from different committee members are described in 
Table 1. The responses show that all of the committees had a clear man-
date, but participants varied in terms of their perception of committee flex-
ibility (Table 2). Participant comments suggest that the cultures of the 
different committees were quite dissimilar. 
Table 2 : Flexibility 
Clear Mandate Clear Mandate 
With Evidence but no Evidence 
of Flexibility of Flexibility No Clear 
or Change or Change Mandate 
KEQC 8 1 
KEAC 5 1 
FRC-N 3 2 
HFTCC 5 3 
Participants from the KEQC gave the clearest indication that they 
recognised that the Commission had adapted to meet the challenges it 
faced. One participant stated : 
The rules under which the Commission acts were developed by people who, quite 
frankly, had no idea whether or not this would or wouldn’t work. They had enough 
foresight to structure a set of rules that were reasonably loose and we have taken 
full advantage of the flexibility that these rules imply. 
Others emphasised an increasing focus on social as well as biophysical 
impacts and the committee’s growing skills and abilities to conceptualise 
and address these impacts. Part of this involved increasing knowledge 
among committee members about the perspectives of Inuit communities. 
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KEAC members all indicated that the mandate of the Committee was 
clear. Most indicated that the Committee had a great deal of scope for flex-
ibility, but that this scope was often not realised because of the lack of re-
sources, and because the KEAC did not have a clear place in government 
decision-making (these are discussed in greater detail below). FRC-N has 
not met very often, but participants indicated that the Committee had 
moved “from being concerned by process and rules to one which is more 
goal oriented.” Similarly, another member stated : “I try to implement the 
spirit of the Agreement more than the letter.” Several members also spoke 
about modifications the Committee made in its operations to attempt to 
reduce duplication of processes in small communities. However, more 
members (two) than on the KEAC or the KEQC could not identify changes 
the committee had made to its operation to meet needs in Nunavik. 
The HFTCC had the largest number (and proportion) of participants 
who could not identify changes the Committee had initiated in response to 
challenges. Where participants did identify changes in Committee process, 
the main emphasis had to do with modifications to make it work more ef-
ficiently. Participants identified the establishment of working groups with 
representatives from each of the parties as an important step toward reach-
ing a decision on some issues. Most of the comments, though, had to do 
with members gradually learning how to make things work. One partici-
pant indicated that “the Committee is getting better and better in terms of 
implementing its role and mandate.” Another commented in a similar vein : 
“it is getting better all the time. It is more precise [...] things are progressing 
slowly but it goes according to the old saying which is “slowly but surely”.” 
3.1.2 Membership and Group Dynamics 
Group dynamics contribute to adaptiveness and the literature suggests 
that positive dynamics are more easily achieved in smaller groups. The in-
terviews did not explore the relationship between size and group dynamics 
directly, but we did probe whether the participants felt that committee 
members had the appropriate skills and linkages, and at various points we 
asked participants if they felt the committee was working well. Answers to 
these questions provided an insight into how participants felt about com-
mittee dynamics. 
The Committees are composed of different numbers of members, rep-
resenting different political constituencies. The smallest and simplest is the 
FRC-N, with five members appointed by Canada and the KRG. The KEQC 
and the KEAC each have nine members, with the KRG and Quebec ap-
pointing members to the former, and the KRG, Quebec and Canada ap-
pointing members to the latter. The HFTCC is the largest and most 
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complex, with 16 members appointed by Quebec, Canada, the Cree, the 
Inuit and the Naskapi. The results suggest (Table 3) that this complexity 
has an effect on group dynamics. At the same time, though, an analysis of 
the content of participant comments shows that the smallest and least com-
plex committee (FRC-N) did not generate the most positive dynamics. In 
other words, more than size and complexity are at issue here. 
Table 3 : Group Dynamics 
Group Dynamics Group Dynamics Group Dynamics No 
Mostly Positive Positive & Negative Mostly Negative Opinion 
KEQC 9 
KEAC 5 1 
FRC-N 4 1 
HFTCC 2 3 1 2 
Participants from the KEQC and the KEAC had extremely positive 
evaluations of their fellow members. The following are some samples from 
the KEQC : 
The committee is harmonious ; there are no political factions. 
I think it’s the first time I have had such a relation with other Commission mem-
bers. We don’t make fun of anybody. You might have a stupid concern, but I don’t 
think anybody is afraid of raising the concern. Everybody will take the concern 
and try to find the answer. 
There is a great deal of respect amongst the members for each other and that will 
hold it in good standing. 
My knowledge has always been respected. 
On the KEAC, the comments about negative dynamics had to do with 
federal and provincial politics. However, other comments were extremely 
positive : 
We discuss until everyone agrees. There is always good communication. 
The members really respect each other which makes a committee that is willing to 
work so hard. The members are fantastic. 
Comments from FRC-N participants were more muted, but still posi-
tive : 
There is no perfect committee but I think it is good now. 
Consensus comes easily. 
We tend to have unanimity and if we cannot, then the minority is free to express 
itself. 
We have a good committee and performs quite well. 
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Comments from HFTCC participants were mixed : 
I’m happy with the way the committee is going. If I wasn’t happy, I would let 
them know. 
People are familiar with their areas of expertise but do not have a good knowledge 
of how the committee works. This wastes everybody’s time. 
Some people are professional and are very conscientious about being there in a 
professional capacity dealing with the issues at hand. Some people tend to be more 
politicised and will use that to their advantage. 
Some meetings are tension filled, but more than fifty percent of the time we don’t 
have conflict. There is a mix of politics and science on this committee so it is not 
always easy. We have some tensions on some subjects and on other subjects it is 
O.K. 
The member of the committee are all knowledgeable and committed. 
3.1.3 Networks 
The third aspect of adaptiveness we address here has to do with the 
degree to which participants feel they are embedded in networks that allow 
them to make appropriate decisions. We did not explore fully the extent to 
which there is interaction with other organisations to work out “desirable 
futures”, but we did ask participants whether committee members had link-
ages to people, organisations and information sufficient to ensure that com-
mittees had the appropriate information upon which to base their 
deliberations. The results showed (Table 4) that all of the committee mem-
bers felt that the networks of which they were a part were appropriate and 
adequate for committee mandates. 
Table 4 : Networks 
Committee Committee 
Networks Networks No 
Adequate Not Adequate Evaluation 
KEQC 9 
KEAC 6 
FRC-N 5 
HFTCC 8 
3.1.4 Summary 
The size and complexity of the HFTCC seems to be a barrier to its 
adaptiveness, despite its attempts to facilitate decision-making through the 
creation of working groups. However, size and complexity are not the only 
variables working here. The smallest and simplest committee (FRC-N) did 
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not appear to be the most flexible, and there were differences between the 
KEQC and the KEAC, despite their similarity in size. 
3.2 Effectiveness 
3.2.1 Legislative Basis 
All of the committees studied in this paper have a basis in legislation. 
Quebec legislation enacting the environmental regime was Bill 30 : An Act 
to again amend the Environmental Quality Act, assented to December 22, 
1978. Legislation establishing the HFTCC was also enacted on December 
22, 1978 with Bill 28 : An Act respeciing hunting and fishing rights in the 
James Bay and New Quebec territories. The HFTCC had established a 
secretariat, opened an office, and held its first meeting by the start of 1976. 
All of the bodies were operational by 198039. 
3.2.2 Powers 
The decision-making powers of the committees vary — some are advi-
sory, some are decision-making, and some have a combination of advisory 
and decision-making powers (Table 5). However, even among committees 
that have similar powers according to legislation, the ability to affect gov-
ernment decision-making appears to vary. 
Table 5 : Powers 
Committee Committee Committee 
is Decision- is Advisory is Advisory Can’t 
Making But Advice 
is Usually Followed 
But Advice 
is Often Ignored 
Evaluate 
KEQC 9 
KEAC 6 
FRC-N 5 
HFTCC* 4 3 1 
* Participants noted that the HFTCC has decision-making power over the upper kill limit 
for some species. 
KEQC participants were unanimous in pointing out that the Commis-
sion is a decision-making body, not an advisory one. The members who 
had been on the Commission the longest recalled only two instances where 
39. P.F. WILKINSON and M. VINCELLI, The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement : 
An Evaluaiion of the Implementation of its Environmental Regime,, Ottawa, Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995, n. p. 
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the Minister had been uncomfortable with a recommendation from the 
Commission and had asked them to reconsider. KEAC members indicated 
that the Committee was advisory, but because its role was not well defined 
(see below), it was difficult to evaluate the impact of its advice. Moreover, 
members felt that the lack of resources made it difficult for the Committee 
even to fulfil its advisory role. 
Members in the FRC-N indicated that, although the Committee is ad-
visory, its recommendations were almost always approved. HFTCC re-
sponses were the most mixed, with some members indicating that 
Committee advice was almost always followed, and others indicating that 
sometimes advice was ignored. In the latter case, members indicated that 
the Committee often worked out another strategy for implementing its 
advice. 
3.2.3 Implementation 
Committee effectiveness does not only depend on powers and whether 
a committee has a legislative definition (Table 6). It also depends on the 
whether it is accorded a place in government decision-making, and whether 
it is provided with resources that allow it to discharge its mandate. Partici-
pants evaluated committees very differently on these criteria. 
Table 6 : Implementation 
Established Not Established 
in Government in Government No Adequate Resources 
Decision-Making Decision-Making Evaluation Resources Not Adequate 
KEQC 9 9 
KEAC 5 1 5 
FRC-N 5 5 
HFTCC 6 2 8 
KEQC participants unanimously agreed that the Commission had a 
clearly defined place in government decision-making. They indicated that 
funding was sufficient for day-to-day operations, and that when there were 
big projects, more resources were allocated. 
KEAC participants showed a similar level of unanimity as KEQC re-
spondents, but in the negative rather than in the positive. Participants felt 
that the KEAC had not been made a part of government decision-making 
structures and that it was often ignored. One participant stated, although 
all of the parties to the Agreement had a strong commitment to have an 
environmental watch dog in the North, it was not being used in real life : 
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Quebec has its own expertise. Federal has its own expertise and the Region is also 
building its own expertise. Each of these parties thinks that it knows everything to 
make a decision. Inside these government bureaucracies the level of knowledge 
about the potential usefulness of the Committee is very limited. 
Others pointed out that, although the Committee had a great deal of 
freedom to address what they wanted to, they had little power because 
governments forget that it existed. The KEAC secretariat had been relo-
cated from Kujjuaq to Quebec City in the late 1990’s, and three partici-
pants felt that the KEAC had better visibility when its main office was in 
the North because it was physically closer to other KRG government de-
partments. 
Participants also unanimously agreed that the budget for the KEAC 
was too limited to allow it to discharge its mandate, especially since it was 
responsible for a large region with many serious environmental issues. 
According to one participant : “We don’t have anything to do research. We 
don’t have anything to ask for expertise, even though it is in our mandate.” 
Another noted that positions on the Committee were voluntary and, be-
cause members worked at other occupations, they did not have the time to 
fulfil the Committee mandate. These observations reinforce Wilkinson and 
Vincelli’s40 conclusion that : 
The mandate of the KEAC is very broad and diffuse, potentially encompassing so 
much that it becomes virtually impossible to discharge except perhaps with very 
liberal access to technical advice and with members who are available on at least 
a half-time basis. 
In contrast, members of FRC-N felt that the Committee had a clear 
place in government decision-making, and that funding was generally suffi-
cient. One participant suggested that more funding should be made avail-
able so that members could experience the North in different seasons. Most 
HFTCC members felt that the Committee was part of regular government 
decision structures, but some indicated that there were some situations 
where the Committee should have been consulted but had not been, be-
cause government officials did not know of its existence. Participants 
thought that the Committee could do more with increased resources, but 
that general resources were sufficient to allow the Committee to fulfil its 
mandate. 
40. P.F. WILKINSON and M. VINCELLI, op. cit,, note 39. 
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3.2.4 Summary 
Of the three dimensions examined in this paper, the committees 
showed the most dramatic variation in the design characteristics contribut-
ing to effectiveness. Participants found that both the KEQC and the FRC-
N were effective, in spite of the fact that the KEQC has decision-making 
power while the FRC-N is advisory. This suggests that legislative power is 
not the only factor determining the role a committee can play with respect 
to government decision-making. The lack of resources in the context of a 
broad mandate appears to be an obstacle to the effectiveness of the KEAC. 
It was not clear from the interviews why some participants on the HFTCC 
felt that the committee was not entirely effective in its influence on govern-
ment decision-making. 
3.3 Representing Aboriginal Perspectives 
3.3.1 Consulting Communities 
All of the committees had a variety of ways of obtaining the views of 
Inuit communities. These included drawing on the expertise of Inuit repre-
sentatives, talking to municipal councils, consulting communities more in-
formally (often using the radio), formal public hearings, and community 
member’s presentations to the committee. There was not enough variation 
between committees to identify major differences in consultation practices. 
3.3.2 Inuit Role in Decision-making 
Similarly, all of the participants felt that Inuit representatives played 
important roles in decision-making. Quotes from non-Inuit participants on 
all of the committees demonstrate considerable consensus on this issue. 
For example, a participant from the KEQC noted : “Since the projects are 
in the Inuit communities, the Inuit perspective brought to the Commission 
is very, very important [...] Whenever they raise a point, we consider the 
point. If we are not able to answer the question ourselves, we ask for the 
information to be presented.” According to a KEAC member : “We are 
working collectively for the common good of Nunavik residents. And if 
the Inuit representatives at the table are not interested in an issue, or are 
opposed to a decision, we won’t go far [...] We work, keeping in mind that 
the Inuit parties have a kind of veto.” An FRC-N member stated : “The 
role of the Committee is to make sure that the Native people have their 
word and that they are part of the decision-making.” “The Inuit play an 
important role because it is their territory [...] We can argue — we argue a 
lot, but we respect the decision of the Inuit” noted a member of the HFTCC. 
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Inuit responses did not contradict these views. Inuit members indicated 
that their knowledge was respected, that Inuit were satisfied with their role, 
and that they would say something if there were problems. One Inuk re-
marked: “The Chairman always asks the question: “Is it O.K. with the 
person who is Inuit ?” They really pay attention to what the Inuk has to 
say.” An Inuit representative on another committee noted : “when we think 
there is an issue that is not being dealt with enough we just bring it up and 
they look at it more.” 
3.3.3 Cultural appropriateness 
A number of reviews have suggested that the committees created by 
the Agreement are inappropriate for Native cultures. Problems identified 
included the incompatibility of decision-making processes with Inuit cul-
tures, the difficulty Native representatives experienced making decisions 
for communities and individuals not directly involved in discussions, lan-
guage barriers, the challenges posed by technical materials, and the infre-
quent use of traditional ecological knowledge in decision-making41. 
Wilkinson and Vincelli42 note that, although committees were expected to 
work differently in the area referred to in the Agreement because of at-
tempts to incorporate Native values and participation, in fact they did not 
meet those expectations. 
In this study we asked questions about cultural appropriateness and 
whether participants felt that there were barriers to Native participation in 
decision-making. Answers were consistent across the committees, and they 
provided a different perspective from these earlier reviews. Participants 
noted that Inuit members had considerable experience working in these 
types of organisations and that the style of deliberation and decision-mak-
ing was not foreign to them. For example, one participant stated : “We are 
working with Inuit organisations that are more and more following the pat-
tern of non-traditional organisations. More and more we see a process that 
is quite similar to the process you would observe in a smaller city to the 
south.” Participants also felt that Inuit representatives had experience with 
technical materials and that language was not a major barrier. Moreover, 
one participant noted that : “none of the members are that shy that they 
won’t ask a question.” 
41. L.F. BROOKE, op. cit., note 37 ; A. PENN, The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agree-
ment : Natural Resource,, Public Land, and the Implementation of a Native Land Claim 
Settlement, Ottawa, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995 ; P.F. WILKINSON 
and M. VINCELLI, op. cit., note 39. 
42. P.F. WILKINSON and M. VINCELLI, op. cit,, note 39. 
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In support of these observations, Inuit representatives said that when 
they could not understand the language, someone translated for them. One 
Inuit representative noted that there were Inuit concepts that could not be 
translated into English, and that it was difficult to “combine ideas.” In this 
context his strategy was to “pick one [concept] which is right for the people. 
That’s how it works.” What is interesting about this response is the 
acknowledgement that different cultural perspectives existed on the com-
mittee, but that it was still possible to make appropriate and culturally ac-
ceptable recommendations. 
3.3.4 Summary 
In the context of marked differences in participant evaluations of the 
other dimensions, the consensus on the issue of representation is striking. 
It may be that, over time, a comfort level in participating in these venues 
has emerged among committee members. 
Conclusion 
Co-management committees play an important role in contributing to 
food security in Nunavik, especially with regard to protecting sources of 
country food. A comparison of four committees, established at about the 
same time, involving similar groups of people, highlights some of the ele-
ments that contribute to or interfere with their ability to carry out their 
respective mandates. With respect to adaptiveness, the participants ranked 
the KEQC as most adaptive and the HFTCC as the least adaptive, with the 
other two committees in the middle. The size and complexity of the 
HFTCC seem to negatively affect its ability to be adaptive. However, be-
cause the smallest and least complex committee was not ranked as most 
adaptive, these factors do not seem to be the only one operating in co-man-
agement committees. According to participant’s evaluations, the commit-
tees varied most in their effectiveness. Effectiveness was not directly 
related to legislated decision-making powers : participants felt that both an 
advisory committee and a decision-making committee were effective in 
influencing government decisions. A lack of resources in the context of a 
broad mandate appeared to be an obstacle to effectiveness. Participants in 
the four committees showed the most unanimity in their evaluations of the 
committee’s abilities to represent Aboriginal people and cultures. Both 
Inuit and non-Inuit representatives felt comfortable with the committee’s 
role in this respect. 
There is one additional factor that emerged from the interviews, which 
is not highlighted in the literature. This has to do with the roles that indi-
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vidual personalities play in making particular committees work. Inevita-
bly, participants mentioned committed or knowledgeable individuals or 
groups of individuals when they described areas where committees had 
been successful, or had made an impact. This suggests that, in addition to 
organisational design characteristics that need to be in place, individual 
personalities can play a major role in making committees work. This as-
pect deserves further attention in the literature. 
